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Abstract
This article provides an overview of Mongolia’s current political and strategic 
viability and its importance to the United States and international community. 
The author advocates a fi ve-point Mongolia Action Plan (MAP) and suggests 
that new administrations in Washington and Ulaanbaatar should forge a vibrant 
and bold relationship.
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Introduction
Although a small country in terms of population, Mongolia deserves enhanced US 
and international recognition after pursuing for almost two decades democracy, a free 
market economy and an active regional and international role. Despite proliferation and 
authoritarian challenges elsewhere in the region, Mongolia has quietly and resolutely laid 
down the foundations of democratic institutions and a process of governance that, despite 
many challenges, affi rms US goals. 
Situated between giants Russia and China, this land of blue skies lies at a crossroads 
of increasing geographic signifi cance. China, Russia and others have expanding interests 
in mineral and energy resources within Mongolia, with copper mines in southern Mongolia 
potentially feeding the needs of 80 percent of the Chinese copper market. During the Cold 
War, Russia used Mongolia as a listening post into China, and the two giants in recent 
years have pressed Mongolia for support in a multilateral counterterrorism and economic 
development forum through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. As both giants have 
pressed trilateral and other arrangements, Mongolia has sought to counterbalance these 
external forces through the propagation of its Third Neighbor approach, including good 
relations with the US and others as an important third spoke. Mongolia has emerged as 
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an active proponent for regional institutions and actively encouraged attention from the 
United States, European Union, and others in fostering aid, foreign direct investment, and 
military cooperation.
To that end, Mongolia is advancing a regional peacekeeping training center and 
provided quick support to US campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Among the fi rst of Asian 
nations to offer condolences post-9/11, Mongolia, despite some internal controversy, 
afforded swift action over fl ight rights to US aircraft toward Central Asia, and committed 
troops to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. That participation has 
emerged as more signifi cant than one might assume of small nation support in several 
instances, namely in Mongolian troops’ unique rapport with Hazara forces in Afghanistan 
(the Hazara being descendents of the Mongolian Golden Horde and identifying with the 
Mongolians on ethnic lines); in the skilled marksmanship of a Mongolian soldier in Iraq 
that prevented a suicide attack; and in the continued rotation of Mongolian troops into 
the combat theaters, despite some opposition at home and concerns more broadly across 
Asia.
Mongolia as a Model of Democracy 
Well beyond providing support for international efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, though, 
Mongolia has a larger, and in the long-term, more strategic role to play: one in US and 
regional interests. First and foremost, Mongolia, despite challenges to the process, is a 
potential harbinger of democracy for Central Asia, where autocracy continues to dominate, 
borne of the Stalinist legacy, and where energy reserves, energy access, and US military 
action to the south have led to a hands-off approach from Washington. The United States 
would fi nd ready results in supporting further Mongolia’s own democratic consolidation 
and encouragement of the Mongolian model for the institution-weak Stans of Central 
Asia. 
Mongolia also acts as an example of a working democratic government and open 
economy for North Korea, a mere 1800 miles away.  Though the regime of Kim Jong-Il 
has no ready inclination to discuss Mongolia’s political model, it has expressed continued 
interest in how Mongolia had transitioned to free market capitalism and privatized 80 
percent of once state-held assets. Beneath the rhetoric, North Korea desperately needs 
stimulation in its economy and will have to fi nd ways to spur productivity and spin-
off state-held economic behemoths of the Stalinist era. Kim Jong-Il has demonstrated 
willingness in this regard through allowing small markets, Chinese businessmen, and 
South Korean economic cooperation at Kaesong and elsewhere. 
As North Korea scours the region for working models, Mongolia, the fi rst nation 
outside the Soviet Union to recognize North Korea, presents an attractive model. This 
has been expressed by North Korean delegations visiting Ulaanbaatar this decade, as 
delegates note the rapid rate of construction in Mongolia’s capital, the prevalence of cell 
phones, and the colorful swath wrought by Mongolia’s dynamic and fashion-forward 
youth, hovering at hundreds of Internet cafes, and neon and video signage for everything 
from credit cards to international travel. What a striking thought that the Mongolian urban 
aesthetic had appeared so similar to that of North Korea two decades ago. 
Given Mongolia’s continued relations with both North and South Korea, 
historical ethnic linkages, adoption of Korean War orphans from the North and recent 
quiet facilitation of North Korean refugees, and its low-key, small nation approach, North 
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Korea appears to trust Mongolia in unique ways. The two have seen mutual exchanges 
at the popular levels, attendant discussions of a range of activitiesfrom small joint 
ventures to arts exchange and farming cooperationand regular senior-level visits. One 
senior North Korean offi cial described the Mongolians as “our only true friends” in the 
region, an area in need of confi dence building and where historical issues continue to 
impede progress. 
Mongolia as Negotiator
Mongolia has fl oated in recent years the idea of Ulaanbaatar as a site for regional 
negotiations. Mongolia was not included in the six-party talks, which may provide even 
more reason to fi nd fresh venues. This works on several levels. First, Mongolia is largely 
lacking in the realm of historical animosities that plague a number of bilateral relations 
among China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia and the United States. Its own 
historical animosities toward China are relatively muted, given the growing economic 
and political relations. Nothing by way of the resentments in China-Japan, Korea-Japan, 
Russia-Japan relations attendant to textbook, territorial claims or other such issues persist. 
Mongolia is a fairly blank slate for regional planners, who might see benefi ts in distancing 
talks from more traditional venues. 
Second, Ulaanbaatar’s location is surprisingly convenient in the globalization era. 
Whereas it was once remote and at a seemingly far-fl ung corner of Northeast Asia, an 
increasing number of carriers and routes make it easily accessible, at only ninety minutes 
to three hours from every major Northeast Asian capital. 
Third, Mongolia took the lead in defi ning human security interests by hosting a 
United Nations Conference on Human Security earlier this decade. Regionally, natural 
disasters and food and shelter shortages present new challenges and new suggestions for 
government responses, institution-building, and military roles and missions. Mongolia, 
which suffered under its own winter zud, which decimated livestock earlier in the decade, 
seeks to play an important role in hosting discussions meant at identifying common 
solutions to new security challenges. Interestingly, despite the zud, Mongolia quietly 
airlifted meat and other donations to the eastern part of North Korea after fl ooding in 
2001 – a contribution that went largely without international notice. 
Mongolia, with developmental challenges common to rural China, the Russian Far 
East, and North Korea, also will fi nd itself linked into future talks on regional solutions, 
so bringing it to the table by meeting at its table makes sense. In the short term, Mongolia 
can also contribute its development as a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) as a model 
for the Korean Peninsula.
But to realize potential on strategic cooperation fronts, the US and international 
community must fi nd ways to help rectify Mongolia’s political fragility. An observer 
of Mongolian politics sees many parallels to the personality-led, political upheaval of 
South Korea in the late 1980s, and the precariousness of the current process, especially 
in light of its potential role as exemplar, demands enhanced US support. Mongolia’s 
embracement of the democratic process has been remarkably rapid in historical terms, 
especially given seven decades of communist rule. Mongolian institutions have evolved 
with time and appear progressive relative to other parts of Eurasia. Though evolving, 
Mongolia’s institutions are in desperate need of professionalization support from the 
United States and others. 
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Challenges within Mongolia
To its credit, Mongolia has internal proponents of good governance. President Tsakhiagiin 
Elbegdorj emphasized transparency and equity in his June 2009 inaugural address, and MP 
Sanjaasürengiin Oyun has for years held a torch for accountability and good governance. 
From supporting such home-grown initiatives to providing technical resources and 
encouraging upward adjustment of public service wage levels – thus stemming incentives 
for corruption – the US and international community can play a critical role in supporting 
Mongolian democracy in consolidation. Pushes for further professionalization of media – 
fair and free by regional standards but under heavy political pressures – need to increase 
as well. Signifi cantly, the all-crucial social contract needs to be fostered in Mongolia, 
as many citizens grow more vested in democracy. The US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and others have made progress on many of these fronts over the 
years. 
In terms of economic growth, investors have recognized Mongolia’s high literacy 
rate and have likened its entrepreneurship and work ethic with that of South Korea a 
generation ago. Indeed, South Korean small business and investment plays a leading role 
in Mongolia, and US and Northeast Asian encouragement of education and jobs appears a 
real way forward. Mongolia’s President Elbegdorj, when Prime Minister, called for more 
computers in schools, the development of a Mongolian technology assistance corridor, 
support for basic educational reform and enhancements, such as English education, and 
new technologies.
The very critical area of poverty alleviation remains critical to ensure that Mongolia 
is best served in meeting new challenges, such as rapid urbanization and the sprawl of ger 
villages on the outskirts of the capital. Many of these ger villages function without basic 
utilities and other services, and health and joblessness issues present tremendous obstacles 
for growth. Fortunately, the latest package of proposals takes on poverty alleviation and 
the ger village crisis, as well as health care and rail improvements. Compounding the 
frustrations of extreme poverty in Mongolia – one third of Mongolians live below the 
poverty line – are perceptions of growing economic and social inequities. Shock therapy 
and the current economy have seen a very few become extremely wealthy and foodstuffs 
and fuel have skyrocketed, creating real fi ssures between the haves and have-nots.
Compounding these economic and social costs are commodity and energy hikes 
associated with the global economic crisis. Notably, when China or Russia sneezes, 
Mongolia catches a cold. That may literally be the case as Mongolia confronts a range of 
non-traditional security threats, from pandemics like swine and avian fl u to the HIV/AIDs, 
which are on the rise in neighboring China and Russia. Migratory fl ocks that pass through 
could impact Mongolia in a manner that the culling of poultry may not check. Foot-
and-mouth disease at times has led to Russian and other European blocks on Mongolian 
exports. The economic impacts of quarantines might compound state responses to the 
very real public health risks.
Mongolia Action Plan
This evaluation of contemporary Mongolia, and its challenges and offerings to the region, 
underscore the need for the United States to adopt a comprehensive Mongolia Action 
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Plan (MAP). Critical aspects of the MAP include:
1)  A signifi cant upgrade in the status of Mongolia-US relations. The Obama 
Administration should recognize Mongolia’s political, economic and social transitions. 
Mongolia, with relatively minimal political support – aside from economic aid from the 
international community – has managed its own process, and the US should applaud 
Mongolia’s gains, especially as it seeks to expand democracy’s global reach. Mongolia 
has not seen regular, senior US executive-level visits, senior Congress-Parliamentary 
exchanges or others. In the course of daily management of relations, Mongolia merits 
higher levels of consideration. For example, at the Department of State, Mongolia has 
been under the charge of junior and mid-level offi cers also overseeing work on China’s 
economic relations. Mongolia needs to separate from the China desk and be either 
grouped with Korea, with which it shares some commonalities and where it might be 
useful relative to the North Korea impetus, or left on its own. Stronger outward support 
needs to accompany structural approaches in the relationship. 
2)  Upgrade in economic support, educational exchange and institution 
building. It is critical to identify a few of the more creditable Mongolian entities that should 
receive the lion’s share of US economic support; the Zorig Foundation stands as one such 
necessary recipient. The Open Society Institute (OSI) – borne of Soros Foundation efforts 
in Mongolia – represents a spin-off of outside-initiated programs into Mongolian hands. 
3)  Support for Mongolia’s abilities to meet its new strategic realities. 
Mongolia needs friends to help address its security realities in new and creative ways. 
Robert D. Kaplan’s work Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground 
described the contribution of former US Defense Attaché Colonel Thomas Wilhelm 
in helping Mongolia defi ne essential, new missions to: secure Mongolia’s borders not 
against a Chinese military invasion, which would be impossible, but against migration 
from that country and infi ltration by Central Asian terrorists; improve its ability to respond 
to natural disasters; and train peacekeeping forces, which would raise the country's profi le 
and provide diplomatic protection from Russia and China. 
4)  Support for Mongolia in regional security fora and contributions relative 
to approaches on North Korea and Central Asia. Despite support for Northeast Asian 
cooperation, some proponents have left Mongolia off the slate for track 1.5 (semi-offi cial) 
and track 2 (unoffi cial) fora, such as the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). 
This needs to be corrected in light of new security realities and potential contributions. This 
would include identifying Mongolia as a central location for dialogue on Central Asian 
Development – prominent Mongolian strategists have called for a defi ning leadership role 
to the countries to its west – and encouragement of Mongolian exchanges and confi dence 
building with North Korea. As the heady development challenges of infrastructure, energy, 
environment and poverty alleviation emerge, that process may expand or see spin-offs in 
the forms of expanded multilateral organizations or initiatives; or minilaterals – more 
defi ned, mission-oriented, ad-hoc small groupings that should include Mongolia. Koreans 
in Mongolia have suggested that there should be Mongolian-hosted agricultural collectives 
employing North Korean labor and with South Korean investment. The argument is that 
this type of approach would benefi t Mongolia and provide test cases for inter-Korean 
cooperation. These trends need to be encouraged in offi cial, semi-offi cial and unoffi cial 
processes.
5)  Support for new economic initiatives, including enhanced foreign direct 
investment. Mongolia needs to be included in and encouraged forward in its continued 
－24－
economic opening. The establishment of a Northeast Asia Free Trade Association with 
the United States, Japan and Korea would further enhance Mongolia’s Third Neighbor 
options and reinforce the Mongolia-Korea-Japan natural economic territory. Japan has 
been Mongolia’s largest aid provider, and South Korea plays a signifi cant role as well. 
That territory could see US, Korean and Japanese banks and investors active in Mongolia 
and benefi ting from Mongolian resources. A greater US commitment should realize 
a boom in Mongolian imports to the US and enhanced US tourism and investment in 
Mongolia, beyond mining, airlines (Boeing, US carriers), information services and such. 
So too, the US might push forward the realization of the Tumen River Development Zone, 
which Mongolia earlier supported but which has seen minimal growth; a comprehensive 
package for North Korea might entail an active role for Mongolia in the Tumen River 
development. These types of economic options are critical for a Mongolia that sees itself 
as highly dependent on China’s economic boom. China has emerged as the obvious 
regional economic leader. Though this may have immediate benefi t in terms of increased 
demand for Mongolian resources, it also leaves Mongolia, like other small states in the 
region, in a bind due to economic security concerns, ranging from the infl ux of illegal 
Chinese labor into a state with a weak social safety net, to broader geostrategic concerns 
about the protection of vital resources and boundaries. 
Affording Mongolia alternatives is in the vital US interest – as well as that of 
Mongolia – and it is crucial for enhanced regional development and security for the 
United States to move forward on the MAP.
Conclusion
With the June 2009 inauguration of President Elbegdorj and visit to Washington by 
Mongolia’s Foreign Minister, it is time for the United States to re-evaluate and expand its 
relationship with this democratic stalwart bridging East and West. Mongolia has emerged 
in less than two decades as a vibrant, if not complicated, democracy, and stands worthy 
of enhanced United States and international attention and support. With its rich cultural 
and historical legacy, literate population and abundant natural resources, Mongolia has 
achieved steady economic growth and stands as a model of reform.
In its own right, Mongolia offers the international community a view of how a 
successful, relatively young democracy should appear. Compared to many other nations, 
Mongolia has progressed remarkably well. Yet too, its fragility in consolidation, highlighted 
by a need for governmental capacity, institutional and media reinforcement, reminds us 
of the responsibility of the United States and international community to better assist 
Mongolia and advance it on a path it deserves high praise for pursuing. 
Mongolia has seen vibrant elections since its transition in 1990. These have been 
notable for high voter turnout, remarkable for the vast distances that some travel to cast 
ballots. The system is not without fl aws, with accusations of too much personality politics 
and corruption, but for the United States and the international community, such concerns 
shine a spotlight on the need to support judicial reform and the effective emergence of 
a system of checks and balances and heightened institutional capacity. The international 
community has been slow to realize the complexity within the two major parties and to 
play toward the reformers in both and beyond. The US and international community should 
also consider the role of shock therapy measures introduced in the 1990s; those measures 
resulted in a lack of transparency in sell-offs and land reform, weakened institutions and 
－25－
the emergence of a foundation for a system whereby a small elite controls disproportionate 
resources, while a large population of poor remain without basic services. The social 
implications for the growing rich-poor gap are enormous. 
Yet for all the fears of democratic rollback in Russia, Central Asia and elsewhere in 
post-socialist systems, Mongolians have embraced choice; an active, vocal, and sensible 
civil society has emerged, and Mongolians value democracy. 
Mongolia too is increasingly active in the regional and global economies and is 
increasingly interconnected. With a young, literate and polyglot population, Mongolia 
sometimes feels less like a Northeast Asian outpost and more like the Netherlands, 
Belgium or a Chinese or Korean small city. In spite of these pluses, Americans have been 
less than steady investors. Post-transition, Mongolians expected heady US investment, 
but Russia, China, the European Union, Japan and Korea are more dominant investors in 
Mongolia. It is time to open necessary doors to stimulate the Mongolian-US economic 
relationship. 
In June 2009, Foreign Minister Batbold had the unfortunate task in Washington 
of informing US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that Mongolia would need to re-direct 
$188 million in US infrastructure development aid aimed at rail improvement due to 
Russian objections. Russia has a 50 percent stake in the railway. 
This should concern Americans, as Mongolia fi nds itself more vulnerable to the 
infl uence associated with foreign moneys, especially from Russia and China, which jockey 
to secure preferential controls in vital extractive industries and within joint ventures. 
Mongolia struggles with these trade-offs, and to this end the US and its foreign business 
community could do well by assisting Mongolia in its strategic diversifi cation.
We should remember this as Mongolia continues on its democratic path under 
President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, who studied at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of 
Government and in Colorado. President Elbegdorj rode into offi ce on an Obama-like 
pledge to provide Mongolians change they can believe in and improvement to their living 
standards. 
The Obama Administration should offer a frank but positive assessment of 
developments in Mongolia. In his addresses in Egypt and Turkey, and having studied 
as a boy in Indonesia, President Obama shows an inclination toward understanding 
“straddle” countries and their roles in building bridges between East and West. As a 
refreshing alternative to tussles with a bellicose North Korea, oft labeled a hermit, the 
United States should applaud Mongolia, the horseman of North Asia. Mongolia has 
listened to international requests, embraced its responsibilities and developed itself as 
one of the region’s more vibrant locales. Such a move by Washington would be a most 
fi tting response to the forces of despotism, hostility and nuclear proliferation that have 
challenged the international arena of late.
